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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



Mi%>Mn>^r 



WAR PAPER 37. 



^I^e Qrnqu of tlie (^un^berland at 
issionarti ^idge. 






Military ©rder of \\}q 190\;g\1 l9$^ion 



United ^fates. 



dOMMAWDEI^V OF THE DI^TI^IdT DF (JOLUIV|Bli\. 



WAR PAPERS. 



37 

^hz ^iT^rmy of the (Xumberland at 3Vti--ioaary I^icLge. 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Lieutenant-Colonel •' 

GILBERT C. KNIFFIN, 

Late U. S. V. 



READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF DECEMBER 5, 1900 



September, unites with the eastern l>ranch at a point a few 
miles east of Rossville. The stream threads its way tlirough 
the valley east of Missionary Ridge, rounding the northern 
end. and. Mowing westward two miles, empties into the Ten- 
nessee four miles above the city. Chattanooga Creek, flowing 
northward through Chattanooga valley, skirts the eastern base 
of Lookout Mountain and em])ties into tlie river opposite the 
toe of Moceasin Point, two miles below the city. A little 
over three-fourths of a mile from the northern extremity of 
the ridge is a gap and tunnel through which the East Ten- 
nessee -Railroad passes, while the Georgia Railroad rounds 
the outlying hills between them and Chickamauga Creek; 
thence southward, crossing the East Tennessee Railroad, and 
on through Ringgold and Dalton to Atlanta. Bragg's line of 
battle, six miles long, extended from Rossville. on the south, 
where the line was weak and attenuated, to a hill north of the 
tunnel, where Cleburne was entrenched, and supported by the 
three remaining divisions of Hardee's corps. The Tennessee 
river, only two miles from Missionary Ridge at the mouth of 
Chickamauga Creek, curves gently westward from its south- 
erly course; then bearing again southward it passes Chattanooga 
four miles from the base of the Ridge. Fort Wood, situated on 
an eminence east of the city, was located two miles from the 
trenches at the base of the Ridge; the average distance from 
this line of works to the crest where the main Confederate line 
of battle was formed was six liundred yards. Intermediate 
between the trenches and Fort Wood were two hills known 
as Orchard Knolj and Bushy Knob, upon which Bragg's ad- 
vanced pickets were posted. The Confederate artillery was 
advantageously posted to sweep the vallev in all directions, 
affording in s(jme jjlaces an enfilading lire upon an assaulting 
line of troops. 



Ctvu. l^atcs, in his ^rapliic (Iclincalion of the scene, saj^s: 
"iVlioul twcl\-e o'rlork on the nii^^lit of the 24tli, I received an 
ordtT from corps lu>a(l(|uartcrs to send Lewis's brigade to rcjtort 
to Major-General Clel>urne on tlie rij^dit, whicli was ■i)rom]jtly 
done. Daylight on the morning of tlie 25th found tlie two 
remaining brigades of the division on the crest of the ridge, 
Tyler's right resting at (jcn. Bragg's headciuarters and Finley's 
])rol()nging the line to the left, while the enem}-, like a huge 
serpent, uncoiled his massive folds into shajjelv lines in our im- 
mediate front." 

The "sha]jely lines" which elicited the aflmiration of Gen. 
Bates and unfolded in full view of the Confederate army was 
composed of the following brigades, after B. ird's division had 
moved from it.s first position on the right to the extreme left 
of Thomas's conimand : On the right was Johnson, with Carlin's 
and Stoughton's brigades, i44of^cers and 2,971 men; on hi§ left 
was Sheridan, with Sherman's, Harker's and Wagner's Ijrigades, 
4.7^-j officers, 6,129 men; nextonthe left was Wood with Hazen's, 
Sam Beatty's, and Willich's brigades, 400 officers and 6,438 
men; then came Baird with Turclhn's. \'an Derveer's, and 
Phelps' brigades, 318 officers, 5,905 men; total in line in front 
of Fort Wood under Gen. Thomas, 1,299 officers and 21,443 
men. Starkweather's brigade (2,250 strong) of Johnson's 
division remained in the fortification at Chattanooga. 

The sun shone brightly down u])on a scene of sur])assing 
grandeur. Every movement of the troops in the valley was 
distinctly \-isible from the headc|uarters of the contending 
armies. The thundering of artillery on the left proclaimed the 
opening of battle in Sherman's front, where Cleburne was 
stoutlv contesting his advance. l*'ar to the right, like a s]:)eck 
in the horizon, the National flag floated from the lofty ])eak of 
Lookout Mountain, and Hooker's \nctorious columns wound 



like a huge serpent down through tortuous paths to the valley 
beneath, whence Carlin's brigade came marching to its old 
position on Johnson's right. 

The head(iuartcr flags of both armies floated defiantly in the 
breeze, Grant's from the parapet at Fort Wood and Bragg's 
immediately opposite, across the valley from the summit of 
Missionary Ridge. There was not a soldier on either side who 
did not know that a great and decisive battle was to he fought 
that day. 

Bragg attributed his defeat to the demoralization produced 
by the sight of so many hostile troops. He says: "But one 
possible reason presents itself to my m.ind in explanation of this 
bad conduct in veteran troops who had never before failed in 
any duty assigned to them. They had for two days confronted 
the enemy marshaling his immense forces in plain view and 
exhibiting to their sight such vast superiority of numbers as 
may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers. But 
our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts where the 
strength of position was against us and with ])crfect success 
that not a doubt crossed my mind." 

As out of the four great battles in which his soldiers had n-et 
the Army of the Cumberland they had been defeated in three, 
they doubtless concluded that the chances were against them. 

The Union Army, on the otiier hand, never faced the enemy 
with greater eagerness for a fight. The Army of the Tennessee, 
fresh from the capture of Vicksburg, and Hooker's command. 
flushed with victor\' at Wauhatchie and Lookout .Mountain, 
flaunted their well-earned laurels in the faces of tlie lieroes of 
Chickamauga, wlio were equally eager to meet tlie tot-. 

That Missionary Ridge would l)e carried when the adxance 
sounded was a foregone conclusion, and to \>c first on the 
sunnnit of the ridge was the g(jal of each sc)ldicr's ambition. 



The iinijrc.ssion llial llu- assault was to stop at the rille-pits 
at the base of the liill does not seem to have pervaded the 
entire hne. In Haird's division on the left and Johnson's on 
the right, the understanding was before the Hne started that 
tliey were to storm the ridge. Baird's regimental oHieers 
were ordered to leave their horses l)aek, Ijeeause the ridge 
looked too steep for them to ride up. Sheridan and Wood, 
however, were clearly of the opinion that they were only to 
carry the rifle-pits. 

The chances appeared to be m favor of Sherman's troops, 
who were already in position u])on outl}-ing hills bevond its 
northern extremity, when far away toward the south Mooker's 
column was seen moving upon the left flank of the Confed- 
erate line. The sun sailed grandly upward and reached 
meridian, but Sherman's sledge-hammer strokes had produced 
no apparent effect. Between his advance and 1 lardee's corjjs 
there was a great gulf flxed, and a steep ascent, and bevond 
it Hardee's stout infantry. 

General Sherman had occupied the night in fortifving his 
position on the hill north of the Ridge. One brigade of each 
division was left on thc> hill ; one of M. L. Smith's closed the gap 
to Chickamauga Creek; two of John E. Smith's were drawn 
back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was 
extended down into the plain, thus crossing the hill in a general 
line facing southeast, where it was su-[)])orted by Davis's divis- 
ion of the Fourteenth Cor])s, .Vrmy of the Cumberland. 

Daylight revealed a deep ravine in front of General Sher- 
man's line, the o])posite side of which was high and precipitous. 
The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded, flanked by two 
hills, one of which on the east was covered with trees, fortifled, 
and held l)y Cleburne's division. The other, occupied by 
Stevenson's and Cheatham's troops, freslily arrived from Look- 
out Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, was partially cleared. 



Wliile General Sherman, with the pluck and persistence 
whicli formed his prominent characteristic, was sustaining the 
shock of battle on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, 
and Hooker's victorious columns were driving Breckenridge's 
left flank through the pass at Rossville preparatory to their 
swee])ing march along the ridge from that direction, the Army 
of the Cumberland gathered itself for llic mighty struggle 
which resulted in jjlantingits banners on the summit of Mission- 
ary Ridge. Sherman's position not only threatened the right 
flank of the enemy, but, occupying a line across the m^ountain 
and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga Creek, it threat- 
ened his rear and stores at Chickamauga Station. Baird's 
division of the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to Sherman's 
support, but u]Jon Grant receiving a note from Sherman in- 
forming him that he had all the force necessary, I3aird was ]jut 
in position on Thomas's left. The ap])earance of Hooker's 
column was at this time anxiously looked for and n:om.entarily 
expected moving along the Ridge. His ap])roach was in- 
tended as the signal for storming the rille-])its in the center 
with strong columns, but the time necessary consumed in the 
construction of the bridge over Chattanooga Creek detained 
him to a later liour than was exjjected. Being satisfied by the 
latest information from him that he nnist by this tin e be on 
his way from Rossville, Grant determined to order the advance 
at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to n^ove forward 
his troops constituting the center — Baird's division, Four- 
teenth Corps, Wood's and Sheridan's divisions. Fourth Corps, 
and Jolmson's division, [""ourtecnth (\)r]js, with a double line of 
skirmishers thrown out. followed in easy sup])orting distance 
by the whole force — and carrying the rifle ]iits at the foot of 
Missionary Ridge. 

General (irant in his report does full credit to tlie troops 



engaged. He says: " These troops move(i forward, drove the 
enemy from the rifle pits at tlic Ijasc of the ridge like bees 
from a hive, stopjjcd hut a moment until tlie whole were in line 
and commenced the ascent of the mountain from rigiit to left 
almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy 
without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley 
of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery 
and musketrv from still well-filled rifle pits on the summit of 
the ridge. No wavering, however, was seen in all that long 
line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until 
the summit was in their possession. In this charge the casual- 
ties were rcmarkal)l_\- few for the fire encountered. 1 can 
account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise 
at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and pur- 
poseless aiming of their })ieces." 

Gen. Thomas's description of the charge is characteristically 
modest. He says : "The whole line then advanced against the 
breastworks and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's 
skirmishers. These giving way retired upon their reserve 
posted within their works. Our troops advancing steadily in 
a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned 
their works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately 
to the crest, where they were closely pursued by our troops, 
who, apparently inspired l)y the im])ulse of victory, carried 
the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely 
upon the heels of the enemy that many of them w-ere taken 
prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and 
ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed. 
After halting for a few^ moments to reorganize the troops, who 
had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill. Gen. 
Sheridan pushed forward in ])ursuit an'd drove those in front 
who escaped capture across Chickamauga Creek. Generals 



lO 



Wood and liaird being obstinately resisted by reinforcements 
from the enemy's extreme right, continued fighting until dark- 
ness set in, slowly but steadily driving the enemy l)efore them. 
* * * Tlie alacrity displayed l)v officers in executing 
their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed by the men 
who did the work, cannot be too highly appreciated by the 
nation for tlic defence which they have on so many other 
memorable occasions nobly and patriotically exposed their 
lives in battle." 

It will be seen that the two generals most prominent in 
directing the operations upon the center leave the description 
of the grand pyrotechnics of the l)attle-field to be supplied by 
subordinate commanders. 

Orchard Knob and the ridge to its right, captured by Granger 
on the 23d, overlooked the long line of rifle pits at the base of 
Missionary Ridge, and every movement of Confederate 
troo])s upon the opposite ridge was distinctly visil)le from this 
point of observation l)y the generals in command. Granger 
had, immediately after occupying this position, thrown up a 
rude breastwork along his front, and constructed an epaulment 
for a six-gun battery on the Knob, in which he placed Captain 
Bridge's battery of four three-and-a-half inch Rodman guns 
and two Napoleons. 

As seen from Chattanooga, the summit of Missionary Ridge 
presents an unbroken line against the horizon. The inequali- 
ties in its surface were obscured l)y the heavy growth of trees 
that skirted the base and extended high uj) the slope. Nearer 
observation reveals deep, dark ravines crossing it at irregular 
intervals. The slope facing Chattanooga presents a bare, 
rough, and broken surface, marked by gullies and ravines. 
Ci ranger refers to it as a mountain barriereven as nature planted 
it, and a most form!dal)le fortress. The commander who licld 



1 1 



it might 1)C warranted in llic conclusion llial troojis coiild not 
storm it. But strengthened as it was by the enenn' willi a 
Hue ot heavy breastworks running along its base, willi two 
additional lines of rifle pits, one partly girdling it midway up 
and the other fringing its erest, and with epaulments on its 
summit for fifty guns, it could well be deemed impregnable. 
The valley lying between the contending lines of battle, a mile 
in width, was wooded in front of Orchard Knol) and the ridge 
to its right where Wood's divisicMi was posted, and open ground 
in front of Sheridan and Johnson, bvit all along the front of the 
Confederate rifle-pits the ground had been cleared that no 
obstruction might be oft'ered to the leaden hail and iron missiles 
with which they intended to greet an assault. Johnson's 
division on the right was so overlapi)ed by the line of works 
in his front that he says they "stretched away to the right as 
far as the eye could reach." 

General Baird's division having been withdrawn from its 
position on the right of Johnson and sent to reinforce Sher- 
man, was brought back to the left of Wood, wlierc it arrived 
at half past tw-o, in time to participate in the assault. He had 
just finished establishing his lines when word came from Xjen~ 
eral Thomas to move forward to the edge of the open ground 
which bordered the foot of Missionary Ridge, wnthin strikin^^ 
distance of the rifle pits, so as to be ready at the signal to dash 
forward with the remainder of the line and capture the works 
in front. An interval of two miles lay between Baird's left and 
Sherman's right flank, unoccupied by Union troops, and the 
line of battle formed by Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's, and John- 
son's divisions was al)out two miles in length. The signa^ for 
the advance, six guns fired in rapid succession from Fort Wood, 
was sounded at twenty minutes before four o'clock, and before 
the smoke had cleared awav, twentv thousand soldiers, fornicd 



12 



in three lines, as if on i)arade, dashed across the intervening 
space and closed in a death-gra])|)lc with the enemy. The 
l)rigades, as formed in line, ranged as follows from left to right. 

Phelps', Van Derveer's, Turcliin's (of Baird's division); 
Beatty's. Willich's. Ilazen's (of Wood's division); Wagner's, 
Marker's, Frank T. Sherman's (of Sheridan's division); 
Stoughton's, and Carlin's (of Johnson's division). 

Starkweather's brigade of the latter division, one of the most 
reliable in the army, remained in the works at Chattanooga, 
but the gallant commander deserted it and joined the assault- 
ing force, where his interest in a regiment from his own State 
came near costing his life — the First Wisconsin. 

The main line was preceded l)y a double line of skirmishers, 
which had no sooner emerged into the open ground in front of 
the Confederate works than Missionary Ridge blazed with con- 
tinuous volleys of artillery, and a galling fire was poured upon 
it from the rifle ])its. Yet in all that magnificent line scarcclv 
a straggler was to be seen. As it swept forward the ground 
was strewn with wounded men, writhing upon the ground or 
staggering to their feet, amid a storm of iron missiles aimed at 
the advancing line, but which, overshooting the mark, fell 
witli fearful effect u])on tlie wounded in its rear. 

Granger describes the scene gra])hically : "At the moment of 
the advance not less than fifty guns o])ened at once, throwing 
a terrible shower of shot and shell. The enemy now taking the 
alarm, commenced to uiove troo])s from l)oth extremities of the 
ridge to fill the works below and around the l)atteries. In the 
meantime tlie troo]>s holding the woods were driven back to 
the works at the base of the ridge, their ]jursuers ra]jidly fol- 
lowing. Here they halted and made a stout resistance; but 
our troo]js, by an impetuous assault . lu'okc their line in several 
jjlaces, then scaling the breastworks at these ])oints, o])ened a 



13 

ilrink and reversed fire Ujion tlieni, whicli, tlirowin^ tliem into 
eonfusion, caused tlieir j)re(,'i])itate tlii^ht. .\lan\' jirisoners 
were left in our liands. and wt' ea])lured a large number of 
small arms. My orders had now lieen fully and successfully 
carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave 
troops who had aeeonii)lishcd so nuich. Although the bat- 
teries on the ridge, at short range, bv direct and enfilading fire 
were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron, and the 
musketry from tlie hill-side was thinning their ranks, they 
dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle ])its, and started 
u]) the hill. 

"They started w'ithout orders along the whole line from right 
to left simultaneously, and with one accord, animated with one 
spirit, and with heroic courage eagerly the}' rushed forward to 
a danger before which the l)ravest men, when marching under 
orders, might tremble. ( )fhcers caught the enthusiasm of the 
men, and the men in turn were cheered bv their officers. Each 
regiment tried to surpass the other in hghting its wa\- up the 
steep acclivity." 

Brave hearts, stout limbs, and strong lungs were required to 
climb the rugged road, and many fell through sheer physical 
exhaustion. Enough were left to press forw'ard in the race for 
the summit, cheered by the shouts of their comrades in the 
rear and animated by the hope of being first to plant their 
regimental flag upon the crest. Those in advance were less 
exposed to the artillery fire, but received the full force of in- 
cessant volleys of musketry. It was evident to everv general 
officer that the troops were disobeying orders in advancing 
beyond the first line of works. Grant incjuired of Thomas by 
whose orders they were ascending the ridge. " Bv their own, 
1 tliink," said that philosopher. "It's all right if it turns out 
right," said Grant. Granger sent a staft' ofhcer to Wood and 



14 

Sheridan to inquire whether they had ordered the troops for- 
ward, and suhsecixientlv (Hrected tlieni to carry the ridge if 
possible. Wood re])hed that the advance from the rifle pits 
was made without orders, but that if he was supported he could 
take the ridge. Sheridan seeing the wdiole line pushing for- 
ward, concluded he must have mistaken the order and sent to 
in(iuire what works were required to be taken, those at the foot 
of the ridge or those at the top. Before his messenger returned, 
his advance was climbing toward the summit, and he was push- 
ing his reserves forward to su])]:)ort it. The charge having 
been begun by the men, it devolved upon the officers to see that 
it was successful. There were none who could be held re- 
sponsible for its failure. The lighting had thus far been done 
mostlv bv the skirmishing lines. The reserves were now 
pushed forward and every precaution taken to check a counter 
charge wliich was momentarily expected to be made u])()n the 
thin line ap])roaclnng the summit. 

(hi the other hand, the broken nature of the ground, seamed 
with ravines and torrent washed gullies, enaljled the Union 
soldiers to shelter themselves from the artillery fire, and to 
creej) unseen u])on the flanks of the Confederates, who were 
gathered in regiments and brigades uponprojectingspursof the 
mountain. Thus Bate, while re])ulsing Sheridan's charge 
upon his front, was apprised of tlic Ixxlv of troops on his right, 
across a ravine. Before he could ascertain whether they were 
friends he was greeted with a volley of musketrv. (icneral 
Bate's left flank (Finley's l)rigade) rested on the Crutchfleld 
road. Adams' brigade of Stewart's division, commanded bv 
Gijjson, was on his right, and se])arated Bate's line from 
Patton Anderson's. On his left was the remainder of Stewart's 
division. < )n an eminence projecting from the right of Bate's 
line toward the front was Slocumb's battery, and Mebane's 



was .stron_2;ly ])()st('(l near liis cciittT. ('()i)l»'s liutterv was still 
turther to tlu' riLjhl, in I'attcm Anderson's line. The former 
had an cnfiladint^f tire u])on the adxaneiiiij; lini', but t.lu' .ground 
descended so al)ru])lly in front of Mebane's battery that his 
j^uns were eoni])aratively useless. Ilaz-cn's men followed Rey- 
nold's so ra])idl\- that they had no time to form in line on to]) 
of the ridge, but tied to the rear. ( )n tijaining the crest Colonel 
Langdon, commanding llazen's advance, captured a battery 
and turned it upon the troo])s on his right, (jcneral Hate 
says: "Anderson was on m\- right and Stewart on mv left. 
These dispositions having been made we awaited the onset of 
the foe, who seemed confidently resting as a giant in his strength 
on the plain below, while volleys on the right told of the conflict 
being waged. Al)Out tliree or four P. M. the enenn- initiated 
a movement along our entire front by advancing a heavv line 
of skirmishers, followed by two unl)roken lines of battle, with 
heavy reserves at intervals. Bvit a slight resistance was given 
to this advance by the troo]3s of Reynold's brigade in the 
trenches in our immediate front. They abandoned the ditches 
on the approach of the enemy's skirmishers and sought refuge 
at the top of the hill, breaking and throwing into slight disorder 
the left of Finley's brigade as they passed through. Major 
Weaver of the Sixth North Carolina regiment seemed to be in 
command. He rallied and formed these troops (who seemed 
to be from two of the regiments of Reynold's brigade) across 
the Crutchfield road, a few paces in the rear of the main line. 
A well-directed and effective fire having l)een 0])ened upion the 
advancing line handsomely re])ulsed it, throwing a portion of it 
behind our vacated trendies and ])reci])itatcd others on their 
second line, which, being out of range of small arms, I ordered 
the firing to cease and the line to fall back a few paces to re- 
plenish ammunition and give the artillery an unobstructed 



1 6. 



swccj). This was executed coolly and wilhout confusion. 
1 took occasion durinj,^ this inler\-al to push a few sharp- 
sliooters forward on the dccli\'ity of the hill in front of the 
smoke as videttes." 

"Order was soon restored in the ranks of the enemy and an- 
otlier onward movement made in systematic and defiant style. 
M\- infantry was again ad\-anced to the verge of the ridge and 
opened a spirited fire, which was constantly replied to. Dur- 
ing this charge my attention was called to some scattered 
troo])s a few hundred yards to my right, making their way 
ai)|)arentl\- without resistance to the top of the hill. Believing 
them to be Confederates falling back from the trenches, 1 for- 
bid my right wing firing on them and sent a staft' officer to 
ascertain who they were. Upon receiving the answer I 
directed upon them a right oblicjue fire of infantry and artillery 
from the right of Tvler's command. It drove them to their 
left, but did not check their assent of the ridge. In a few 
moments I saw a fiag waving at the i)oint in the line of Ander- 
son's division beyond the depression in the ridge where a sec- 
tion of artillerv of Dent's battery had been firing and was then 
located. 1 thought it a Confederate flag, but on nearer approach 
and more minute inspection, I detected the United States colors. 
The line in mv front had recoiled a second tinie, but was rallied 
and was advancing u]) the hill in such numbers as to for])id the 
displacing of any of my command. 1 was directed b\- Gen. 
Bragg to withdraw a -[jortion of my command and dislodge him 
if possible, but u])on suggesting that I was without reserves and 
the danger of withdrawing when so hard pressed on the front, 
which would necessarily cause a ga]) in n,y line, he directed n:e 
to take such as could be best s])arc(l, 1 at once took the com- 
mand under Major Weaver, which had cone from the ditches 
and were aligned across the Crutihliild road, it being disen- 



17 

gaged, and moved it at d()ul)le iiuick some li\'e or six hundred 
yards to tlie elevation on tlie riglit and rear of where the enemv 
had formed nt'iir liisflag. I was unal)le, nolwitltstanchng the 
assistance of Major Weaver, to get his command further, ami 
could only form it on the hill at right angles to my line, pro- 
tecting that flank, and seek to dislodge him by a well-directed 
fire or hold him in check until the re]>ulsed brigade in Ander- 
son's line could be rallic(l and retake their lost grfnind. I laving 
made this disposition and opened fire, I left Lieutenant Bla- 
chard, of my staff, to report the result, and returned to mv own 
line which was being dangerousl\- ])ressed. It was but a few 
moments until the second and third flags were on the ridge 
near the same spot, and the enemy in such numl)ers as to 
drive away Weaver's command, which u])on tlie advance of the 
enemy broke and retired in disorder. 

"The enemy turned our guns upon us and opened a fire of 
musketry from our right and rear. This advantage gained, 
caused my right to give back. In seeking to rally the right I 
did not see the exact time when the flag went up at the left of 
General Bragg's heach quarters. The enemy formed a line of 
l)attle and moved down upon our right at right angles with 
that fiank. Dent's Ijattery was turned upon us, sweeping our 
lines from right to left, and among other effects produced, de- 
stroyed two of Slocumb's limbers. Our men of the extreme 
right gave back in some confusion, and in gallantly seeking to 
rallv them Colonel R. C. Tyler was dangerously wounded. 
Meanwhile the enemy had gained the summit of the ridge on 
our left and subjected vis to a fire from that source. He was 
rapidly developing the division, and yet the larger ])ortion was 
on the front line with the artillery. 1 then moved the com- 
mand, which was in much c-onfusion, to the rear, ordering the 



l)atteries and that portion yet remaining on the front of the 
ridge to retire to the. line on which we were rallying." 

" There was much difliculty in st()])]:)ing the debris whicli had 
sloughed off from the front line, Imt tlirough the personal exer- 
tions of Gen. Bragg and Staf^ and many subaltern officers, we 
formed a line about one thousand yards from the one just 
al)andoned, in a most eligible position across the road leading 
from General Bragg's headquarters. to the ]K)ntoon bridge at 
Bird's Mill." 

It is evident from Bate's re])ort that the first troops to gain 
the top of the hill were those on his right. The brigade that 
he claimed to have repulsed and driven back to the works at 
the base of the ridge was prol)ably Wagner's brigade of 
Sheridan's division, which joined Hazen's brigade of Wood's 
division on the right, and advanced to the left of the Crutch- 
field road (or Moore's road, as it is called on the Union re- 
ports), and fell back to the rifle-pits by order. Sheridan's 
line extended across this road. General Sheridan, in his 
graphic description of the charge u])on the first line of works, 
refers to the doubt that arose in his mind when he saw how 
untenable the rifle-pits would be after they were captured, 
whether he had not mistaken the orders, and that the works 
on the top of the ridge were probably the objective point of 
the charge, disjjatched Ca])t. Ransom of his staft' to General 
Granger for more dehnite instructions. When tliat officer 
returned, all three of his brigades had dashed over the works 
and were ascending the steep slo])e of the ridge. Capt. 
Ransom reached Wagner first and deli\-crcd General Granger's 
order to halt after occujndng the hrst line of works. Wag- 
ner's advance was already fighting its way to the summit, 
but was at once withdrawn with severe loss. General Sheri- 



19 

dan says: "Captain I-lansom tluMi joined nic al)Out the centre 
of the line and eonfirnied tlie orijj^inal order, Imt, believing 
that Mie attack had assumed a new i)hase and that 1 could 
carr\' the ridge, 1 could not order those ofticers wlio were so 
gallantly ascending the hill, stej) by step, to return. I rode 
trom the centre to the left, saw disappointment in the faces 
of the men, told them to rest for a few minutes, and go at it 
again. 

"In the meantime the right and right centre were approach- 
ing the second line of pits led by twelve sets of regimental 
colors. One would be advanced a few feet, then another 
would mo\-c up to it, each vying with the other to l)e fore- 
most, until the entire twelve were ])lantcd on the crest of the 
second line of pits by their gallant bearers. Looking to the 
left 1 saw ; single regiment far over in Wood's lines dash up 
the hill and lay down below the crest. General Hazen's men 
also commenced the ascent. Captain .Vvcrv, of General 
Granger's staff, here came u]) and informed me that the 
original order was to carry the first line of pits, but that, if 
in my judgment, the ridge coidd be taken, to do so. My 
judgment was that it could l)e carried, and orders were given 
accordinglv, obeved with a cheer, and the ridge was carried. 
The right and right centre reached the summit first, being 
nearest the crest, crossing it to the right of General Bragg's 
headrjuarters. The contest was still maintained for a few 
minutes, the enemy driven from their guns, and the battery 
captured. Two of the pieces taken were designated, respec- 
tively, Ladv Buckner and Lady Breckinridge. The adjutant- 
generals of Generals Breckinridge and Bates and many other 
staff officers were taken prisoners, the generals themselves 
barelv escaping. General Bragg having left but a few minutes 
before. The whole division had now reached the crest, the 



20 



cnciiiv was retiring, but had a well organized line covering 
his retreat." 

On the right of General Sheridan was General Johnson, 
with Stoughton's and Carlin's brigade of his division. Tliey, 
too, had assaulted and carried the rifle-pits and were steadily 
ascending the craggy slope of the ridge under a murderous 
hre. The troo])S opposed to him were Clayton's and Strahl's 
brigades of Stewart's division. Owing to the conformation 
of the ground, the left of Carlin's Ijrigade advanced more 
rapidly than the right, and, by a dexterous movement, captured 
the Thirtv-eightli Alabama regiment, which Ijelonged to 
Cla\-ton's division. At this moment Hooker, advancing along 
the ridge from the extreme right, joined the storming line 
at right angles about nightfall, and in conjunction with 
Johnson captured nearly all the troops on the Confederate 
left. The most i)ersistent and obstinate defense of the ridge 
was made bv Bate's two brigades, against which Sheridan's 
line advanced. Wagner being recalled after commencing 
the ascent gave time for Hazen, Marker, and F". T. Sherman 
to move a considerable distance to the front l)efore Wagner's 
line advanced. A ga]) had been left in the Confederate line 
between Adams and Anderson, where Reynolds was expected 
to form, but his men had lost their stomach for fighting and 
passed to the rear, " where the subsequent proceedings inter- 
ested them no more," until Bate's vain attem])t to bring them 
into line against llazen's advance. 

While Sheridan's centre and right, led l)y the gallant Mar- 
ker and F. T. Sherman, were fighting their way stej) by ste]) 
towards the sumnnt, and Carlin was pushing forward on the 
right, Mazen and Willich, having a shorter route and en- 
countering more feeble opposition, gained the crest and 
0]K'ne<l fire on the flanks of liate and Anderson. A moment 



21 



later tlic flags of llarkcr and Turt'hin appeared upon tlie 
siunniit. The CiMifederate artillery, abandoned Ijy tlie 
infantr_\- sii])ports, was captured and turned ujion the fuj^itive 
army, and Missionary Ridge was won. Wagner's brigade, 
released from its perilous ])osition in the trenches, dashed 
forward and took a hand in the frav. 

General Wood describes the charge made b\' his division as 
follows: "When tlie first line of entrenchments was carried, 
the goal for which we had started was won. Our orders 
carried us no further. We had been instructed to carry 
the line of entrenchments at the base of the ridge and there 
halt. But the enthusiasm and im])etuosity of the troojjs 
were such that those who had first reached the entrenchments 
at the base bounded over them and pressed on vip the ascent 
after the flying enemy. Moreover, the works were no protection 
against the enemy's artillerv on the ridge. To remain would 
be destruction; to return would be expensive in life, and dis- 
graceful. Officers and men seemed impressed with this 
truth. In addition, the example of those who commenced 
to ascend the ridge was contagious. 

"Without waiting for an order the vast mass pushed forward 
in the race for glory, each man anxious to be the first on the 
summit. The enemy's artillery and musketry could not check 
the impetuous assault. The troo])s did not halt to fire — to 
have done so wotdd have been ruinous. Little was left to the 
commander of the troops l)ut to cheer the foremost, to encour- 
age the weaker of limb, and to encourage the very few who 
seemed to be faint-hearted. To the eternal honor of the 
troops it should be recorded that the laggards were few in 
number. The interval wliich elai)sed l)etween carrying the 
entrenchments and crowning the summit was one of intense 
and painful interest to all who were not participants in the 



22 



assault. The ascent was an eiTort to try the strongest of hnil) 
and the stoutest hearts. But suspense was not of long dura- 
tion. U])ward steatlily went the standard of the Union, borne 
bv strong arms, and soon it was seen flying on the crest of 
Missionary Ridge. Loud were the shouts with which this 
spectacle was received. Some of the troofjs on the crest of the 
ridge pressed forward in tlie ])ursuit of the flying enemy, while 
others, with great good sense on the ])art of their brigade com- 
manders, were deployed to the right and left, to clear the ridge 
and relieve the pressure on our troops that had not gained the 
summit." 

General Baird's division was formed in two lines, with Tur- 
chin on the right, Van Derveer in the center, and Phelps on the 
left. A heavy skirmish line covered his front and left flank, 
and at the signal the command moved forward, dashed over 
the rifle-j)its through a concentric hre from l)atteries on the 
right and left, and u]j the slope of the ridge in jjursuit of the 
fugitive pickets. General Baird says: "Looking toward the 
right 1 saw that General Turchin had passed the line of rifle- 
pits and was well u])on his way to the top of the ridge. Two 
of his flags, surrounded by a group of the bravest spirits, had 
passed the rest and remained for sometime perched upon the 
side of the mountain c^uite near the top. 1 saw. however, that 
the troojxs on the right had halted near the rifle-pits, contrarv 
to my understanding when I gave him his orders, and that he 
was unsup]jorted. I was in the act of starting forward mv 
other two brigades for this ]Jurposc when 1 received orders not 
to permit my men to go further or to become engaged. 1 was 
]jer])]excd how I was to withdraw Gen. Turchin. It was only 
momentarily, however, as an order came in U\ss than three 
minutes for the whole line to charge to the to|). At that order 
Ijoth lines leaf)ed forward with a shout and rushed up the 



23 

nKmnlain side. The ridL^c, more or less steej) and diriicuU 
tlirougliout, was ])artieiilarl\- so in in\- l'rf)nt, l)Ul the 
strongest and l)ravest men, striking tlie most aeeessihle points, 
soon passed to the front. Regimental organizations became 
deranged, and the hne presented rather the api)earance of 
grou])S gathering around the colors, which they pushed onward 
and upward through the storm of bullets. I cannot too 
strongly commend io the Major-Cicneral commanding the heroic 
gallantry of the officers and men of the division in tliis charge, 
which had few parallels in m\- reading of wars." 

General Baird's division advancing northward along the 
ridge encountered Cheatham's division, capturing prisoners. 
And thus by a grand and simultaneous charge the entire 
crest was crowned Ijy the Union line. 

Bragg was greatly incen.sed by the conduct of a majoritv of 
his troops. He had moved the bulk of his army to the north 
end of the ridge, leaving Breckinridge to look out for his left 
flank. Stewart's division, charged with the defense of the pass 
west of Rossville, and with the removal of the stores from that 
place, failed in Ijoth, and retreated along the ridge towards the 
right. In his report he says: "No satisfactory excuse can 
possibly be given for the shameful conduct of the troops on our 
left in allowing our line to be penetrated. The position was 
one that ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers 
against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was 
made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavv loss. 
Those who reached the ridge did so in a state of exhaustion from 
the great physical exertion in clinfljing, which rendered them 
powerless, and the slightest eft'ort could have (lestro\-ed them. 

Sheridan made no halt on the c-rest. 1 lalf a mile in his front 
disorganized troops, baggage wagons, artillery and horsemen 
could be seen rushing in confusion down the eastern slope of 
the ridge and through the valley beyond. 



24 

SluTidan ;il once directed Wagner and 1 larker to ])ress tlieir 
rear jj;uard and ca])ture tlie wagon train and artillery if 
possil)le. Wagner's right and Barker's left struck the main 
road to Chicakamauga Station, across which Bate had 
formed his line, and moving forward in line of Imttle charged 
and captured nine pieces of artillery. Still further on the 
road led along a high formidable ridge, on which eight pieces 
of artillery were posted, supported liy a body of infantry 
rallied in its rear. Marker and Wagner had no artillery, but 
the gallant men of these brigades dashed forward in a charge. 
Col. Wood, commanding a demi-l)rigade, soon found himself 
in close (luarters, his men clinging to the foot of the hill as 
they had done an hour before to the face of Missionary Ridge. 
The right and left flanks of the division moved forward in an 
impetuous charge. Several pieces of captured artillery were 
brouglit forward and opened fire with good effect, and the Con- 
federate line was driven back to a new position near the Ijridge. 
This was Bate's last stand. He had l)een forced from his posi- 
tion by movements ujjon his flanks, from his second by 
Sheridan's direct advance, and now at near dark he formed 
his line across the road under Bragg's direction, to hold the 
position as long as possible, then cross the Chickamauga and 
report to him at Chickamauga Station. Bate says : "The line 
was soon moulded into proper shape to resist the assault threat- 
ened by our exultant foe." Skirmishers were thrown forward, 
artillcrx- was iflanted near the road, and a regiment withdrawn 
and moved still further to the rear to form the nucleus of an- 
other line. "The fight lasted until nearly an hour after dark," 
says Bate, "and stayed the onward movement which was 
pressing us backward to the bridge." At tlic end ol that time 
he met Breckinridge — who had been contesting Hooker's ad- 
vance — for the first time since the battle begun, and informed 



25 

him of Bragg's orders. Soon afterward ( ioneral ^Stewart came 
up and passed with liis shattered coininand across tlie Ijridgc to 
tlic rear, and Bale lia\-ing I'ullilU'd the order to eover tlie re- 
treat, erossed tlie l)ridge eloselv ])resse(l liy vSlieridan, and look 
up his line of mareli loward Ringgold. The ground was 
strewn with arms and aeeoutrements of every description. 
Sheridan savs: "About twelve o'elock at night, being ordered 
with mv division to press Ihe enemy, I drove him over ("hieka- 
mauga Creek, capturing many prisoners, caissons, limbers, 
wagons, and a large (juantity of artillery, ammunition and 
small arms. 1 reached the creek at about two o'eloek of the 
morning of the 26th, and in the afternoon of the same day re- 
turned to Chickamauga, and was ordered to prepare to march 
to Knoxville to raise the siege." 

But a few minutes elapsed after the ridge was carried before 
the commanding generals appeared upon the scene. Success 
having crowned the movement they grew facetious. Wood 
threatened his men w^ith arrest for wanning a battle without 
orders. A group of soldiers discussing the occurrences of the 
past hour, saw General Thomas riding by. Said one: "Gen- 
eral, w^e know now why you have been dieting us for three 
weeks past; you have been training us for this race." " Yes," 
said the General looking toward Chattanooga, where a steamer 
was just rounding up to the landing, "and there come the 
rations." 

The crest of Missionary Ridge was carried and the Confeder- 
ate troops driven from their works wdthin an hour after the sig- 
nal was given for the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, 
and before dark of that short November day Bragg's de- 
feated armv, most of it routed, was in full retreat through the 
valley of the Chickamauga. 

Fort Wood, Orchard Knob, and every eminence that com- 



26 



manded a view of the ridge were crowded with anxious spec- 
tators of tlie inspiring sight. It was a spectacle rarely wit- 
nessed in warfare, and justiliaMe f)nly l)y its success. Defeat 
would have been ruin. Howard's corps having been sent to 
reinforce Sherman, there were no reserves in rear of the 
centre except Starkweather's brigade at Chattanooga. Gen- 
eral Grant intended that the ridge should be carried from its 
two extremities l)y Sherman and Hooker, while Thomas's 
troops remained in line to prevent a countermovement upon 
Chattanooga. General Sherman conducted the assault upon 
the right of Bragg's line on the principle that characterized 
all his subsequent movements when in command of the army 
on the Atlanta campaign, and which resulted in unvarying 
success. With six divisions at his disposal he attacked with 
eight regiments holding the remainder in support. Von Moltke 
is said to have copied from his illustrious contemporary in the 
Franco-Prussian War, and called it "the Sherman system of 
swarming." While holding his main force in supporting dis- 
tance he conducted a system of swift successive attacks upon 
the enemv's lines with brigades and divisions at unexpected 
points, causing the enemy to constantly reinforce the assaulted 
jjoints from other portions of the line, which in turn were sub- 
ject to attack. 

The movement of the troops from Lookout to Rragg's right 
caused the belief that Bragg had been obliged to weaken his 
center by massing troops against Sherman; subsequent inves- 
tigation shows that not a soldier or a gun left the center to go 
towards Sherman, but, as a matter of fact, three brigades of 
Hardee's left Sherman's front to resist Thomas at the center, 
viz, Brown's, Cummings', and Mancy's, whirli were met by 
liaird, when he reached the top of the ridge. 

No armv commander was ever more devoid of the quality of 



27 

jealousy tlian General Sherman. He might have covered the 
ground in front of llardcc's lini' with dead and wounded and 
won the glory wliieh unthinking |)eo|)k' award to a Ijrave officer 
reckless of luiman life; hut Ins anihition was for the Union 
Army to defeat Bragg in a great battle, and whether that ob- 
ject was attained l)y the troops under his immediate command, 
by those under Thomas, or both combined, was a matter of 
e([ual indifference to General Sherman, li Sherman's troo])s 
could have carried the ])Osition in his front tlie magnificent 
charge of the Arm\- of the Cumberland would have found no 
place in historv. "That portion of Sherman's force which 
was engaged fought with splendid courage and suffered heavy 
losses," says General H. V. Boynton, in the annual address 
delivered at the Twenty-third Reunion of the Society of the 
Army of the Cumberland. " But, astonishing as it seems, it is 
nevertheless true that of the seventeen brigades of Sherman's 
command throughout the day in front of Cleburne's position. 
eleven were not at any time brought into action. Of Howard's 
two divisions of five brigades, only one brigade was sent into 
the fight. General Jeff. C. Davis, whose division from the 
Army of the Cumberland numbered 7,000 men, asked per- 
mission to assault the ridge from its eastern base, where the 
slope was apparently gradual, but was refused, and he took 
no part in the action. Neither histories, memoirs, nor reports 
give any explanation of these remarkable facts." The charge 
to the first line of works by the Army of the Cumberland 
was ordered merely as a diversion in Sherman's favor to 
call back to Bragg's center the troops which Grant believed 
had l)een taken from it, wdien to the astonishment of the 
commanding generals the men themselves, linding their 
position in the trenches untenable, took the game of w^ar 
in their own hands and played it after a fashion of their 



28 



own. " It is all right if it turns out right," said Grant, as he 
saw the only line of troops that stood between the city of 
Chattanooga, which the genius of Rosecrans had given to the 
National Government, and the beleaguering armv that had so 
long menaced it, disappearing among the trees and into the 
defiles of the mountain side, apparently rushing upon certain 
death. As it was a charge which no army commander would 
have ordered without a strong reserve at its back, so it was a 
charge which his antagonist had no reason to anticipate. It 
was in violation of all rules of warfare, and if Bragg had been 
able to repulse it, and by an overwhelming countercharge 
drive the attacking columns back to their original line and be- 
vond the range of his artillery, there would have been fewer 
brigade commanders to claim the credit of having ordered the 
charge, or having first planted their colors on the crest. 



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